Major Themes in Economics
Volume 15

Article 6

Spring 2013

Do NHL Teams Regard Violence as a Positive Player Attribute and
Thus Compensate for Violent Acts?
Mitch Zimmerman
University of Northern Iowa

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uni.edu/mtie
Part of the Economics Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you
Copyright ©2013 by Major Themes in Economics
Recommended Citation
Zimmerman, Mitch (2013) "Do NHL Teams Regard Violence as a Positive Player Attribute and Thus
Compensate for Violent Acts?," Major Themes in Economics, 15, 49-57.
Available at: https://scholarworks.uni.edu/mtie/vol15/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CBA Journals at UNI ScholarWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Major Themes in Economics by an authorized editor of UNI ScholarWorks. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@uni.edu.

Do NHL Teams Regard Violence as a Positive
Player Attribute and Thus Compensate for
Violent Acts?
Mitch Zimmerman
ABSTRACT. Hockey has always been a violent sport. Major injuries in sports have made
headlines in recent years, so it is important to understand how National Hockey League
(NHL) organizations view, use, and sometimes abuse violence. It’s not a secret that some
players in the NHL don’t fit the general profile of a skilled hockey player. This paper
investigates whether the unofficial title of “enforcer” really exists in the NHL by showing
whether teams compensate certain players with non-typical or “enforcer” skill sets. Using
a clustering analysis and a regression analysis there is a clear indication that NHL
organizations do in fact incorporate this “enforcer” attribute when determining certain
players’ salaries.

I. Introduction
“I went to a fight and a hockey game broke out.”
-Roger Dangerfield
It’s long been known that hockey is one of the most physical, violent
sports. It is called the “blood sport.” There are two distinct skill sets in
hockey. The first set includes: puck handling skills, speed, quickness,
quick decision making, and accurate shooting. These are among the
qualities of the highest paid players in the National Hockey League
(NHL). Yet you don’t necessarily have to be good at these skills relative
to other NHL players to be successful. You could just be able to fight. If
this is the case, then do NHL teams regard violence as a positive player
attribute and thus compensate for violent acts?

II. Background
When the National Hockey Association began to fail in the early 1900’s,
the NHL took over. By 1924 the NHL expanded to the US with a team in
Boston and others scattered around Canada. Throughout the mid 1900’s
the league acquired numerous teams. Today there are 30 teams in the
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NHL. These teams range from the East to the West coast, North and
South, and through some southern Canadian cities. The league is split into
two divisions, the East and West. Seasons are comprised of 82 games,
with a four-round bracketed playoff system.
The NHL promotes a faster, more aggressive style of play than other
hockey leagues around the world. The International Ice Hockey
Federation, to which many European teams belong, sets the standard ice
hockey arena at 200 ft by 98 ft. NHL arenas measure 200 ft by 85 ft,
narrowing the rink and shrinking the neutral zone to make for a much
quicker pace of play (Coates, Battre, and Deutscher 2012, 52).
The game has many rules intended to cut down on violence, or
unsportsmanlike actions. These rules prohibit: slashing, hooking, tripping,
grabbing, cross checking, and boarding. Slashing is using a player’s stick
to strike forcefully on the stick, body, or hands of another player.
Hooking is using a player’s stick to slow down another player from
behind. Tripping is using anything to intentionally make an opposing
player fall. Grabbing occurs most often in front of the net and is used to
keep a player from using his stick at will, or pulling a player out of
position. Cross checking is using the shaft of the stick to hit or check an
opponent. Boarding is hitting a player in a manner that is deemed overly
aggressive and dangerous. This usually occurs when a player along the
boards is not looking, and the opposing player hits him from behind, into
the boards. Boarding is among the worst offenses and usually results in
a game misconduct which requires a player to sit out the next game
(Coates, Battre, and Deutscher 2012, 48-49).
The NHL showed it recognized that teams were using players as
“enforcers” when it passed a series of rules during the 2005 season. These
rules were seen as the NHL taking a stand to curb some of the vicious hits
and unnecessary fights that were frequently taking place. Of the many
new rules, one was a fight instigator rule. If a player is deemed to have
instigated a fight in the last 5 minutes of any game, coaches are subject
to a $10,000 fine and the player receives a game misconduct penalty and
an automatic one game suspension (Coates, Battre, and Deutscher 2012,
48).“One primary objective of the new rules will be to reduce the scope
of defensive ‘tools’ a team may effectively employ, and to create a
corresponding benefit to the offensive part of the game – thus allowing
skill players to use their skills and increasing the number of quality
scoring chances in the game” (NHL.com 2005).
The use of enforcers is well-known. While it is not an official title
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such as forward, defensemen, or goalie, it is no secret that every team
uses them. Sportingcharts.com (2013) defines enforcers as:
A type of player known for their ability to check, fight and
intimidate the opposition whose role mainly centers around
deterring and responding to actions by the opposition that are
considered to be aggressive, uncalled for or dirty. Enforcers will
often be players with the most number of fights and lowest
amount of time on ice on a team.
Enforcers are well regarded for their ability to fight and play a
highly physical game. However, they generally lack the speed
and talent of other players on the team and are often found on the
teams 4th line with most teams only carrying one enforcer at a
time.

III. Economic Literature Review
Jones et al. use a regression analysis to determine if the salaries of
“grunts” and “non-grunts” seem to have different coefficients. By doing
a clustering analysis, they effectively sorted out the “grunts” and “nongrunts” (“enforcers” and “non-enforcers”) into two separate categories.
Jones et al. compared the coefficients of the salary equation for both
categories of player to determine if there indeed was a difference. They
showed that there was, implying that the “grunt” category of player is
compensated based on different criteria than “non-grunt,” and that more
penalty minutes means more pay (Jones, Nadeau, and Walsh 1997).
Jones et al.’s findings seem to create a problem with other research.
Studies find that increased penalty minutes tend to lead to lower team
success (Coates, Battre, and Deutscher 2012; Gee and Leith 2007). If this
is the case, it would imply that NHL organizations compensate players
who detract from the success of the team. This does not make sense.
Successful teams draw more attendance and more attendance increases
revenues. While hockey is indeed a sport, it is also a business. Success is
measured in two places: on the ice and at the turnstiles. As D. Coates et
al. put it “Success on the ice means season-long playing effectiveness
measured by the number of points earned by a team; success at the
turnstiles is measured by attendance” (Coates, Battre, and Deutscher
2012, 54).

52

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2013

Stewart et al. addresses this problem by offering the interesting
hypothesis that NHL organizations use violence to maximize profits.
Stewart et al. find that NHL organizations do use violence as part of the
equation to maximize profits (Stewart, Ferguson, Jones 1992). This is
supported by Jones et al. who found that violence has a positive effect on
overall attendance. What Stewart et al. implies is that there are really two
demands from hockey fans: team success on the ice and some amount of
violence. So there is an incentive for teams to pay a premium for players
who can create big hits and become involved in more fights. Stewart et al.
attempts to show that there is indeed a relationship between violence and
salary, and therefore teams would use it in some profit maximizing
equation (Stewart, Ferguson, Jones 1992).

IV. Clustering Analysis and Data
The Wages of Sin: Employment and Salary Effects of Violence in the
National Hockey League, by Jones, Nadeau, and Walsh (1997) is a study
of this precise topic using data from the 1989-90 NHL season. My study
uses the same clustering technique to determine this unofficial category
of players “enforcers” and non-enforcers for the 2010-2011 NHL season,
excluding goalies. Jones et al. use two variables in their clustering
technique: points per game and penalty minutes per game. They classify
players as “grunts” and “non-grunts”. Their clustering analysis classifies
48 of 250 forwards as grunts, and 54 of 138 defensemen as grunts.
The model used in this study adds a third variable, time on ice per
game. This is to separate the more aggressive non-enforcers from the
enforcer category. Like Sportingcharts.com stated, enforcers will have a
high number of fights and a very low amount of time on the ice.
Another criterion added for this study was a minimum number of
games played. A player must have played in at least 90% (75 out of 82)
regular season to be included in the clustering analysis. This effectively
eliminates all temporary players, and severely injured players who
participated in a very small number of games. The logic is that if a player
has played more than 90% of the season, has relatively high penalty
minutes, relatively low points per game, and a low amount of time on ice,
then he fits the generally accepted profile of an enforcer.
Before including a minimum games played criterion, the clustering
analysis yielded a total population 891 players. When the qualifications
for the study were applied, the sample size became 270 players. Of those
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270, 43 were classified as enforcers, 227 were classified as non-enforcers.
1.43 enforcers per team appears to align very well with the definition
provided from sportingcharts.com. Insidetherink.com, an ESPN affiliate,
rated the top enforcers of 2011 by category: heavyweight (5),
middleweight (6), and lightweight (3). Of the 14 top enforcers, 10 were
classified as enforcers by the cluster analysis in this study. The four that
were not listed did not meet the qualifications to be included.

V. Regression Model
The equation used for this OLS regression is as follows:
Salary = $0 + $1 PPG + $2 TOIPG + $3 Enforcer
This is to say that salary is a function of a constant ($0) plus points per
game plus time on ice per game plus a dummy variable that classifies
enforcers (1 for enforcer; 0 if otherwise). Points per game and time on ice
were found to be salary determinants by other studies (Jones and Walsh
1988; Jones, Nadeau, and Walsh 1997) and therefore, will be used in this
one.
Points per game are a key attribute in the game of hockey. Teams
score and win games by earning points. If you score a lot of points, you
make a lot of money, no matter what position you play. Because scoring
is so important to team success, the expected coefficient for points per
game is positive and is expected to be significant.
The data used in this study reveal that the league does in fact tend to
pay more money to players who score more frequently. The graph below
shows that there is a clear trend in the NHL of paying more for higher
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scoring players. However, it also reveals that there must be more to the
picture as the dots appear scattered throughout the graph. If points per
game were the only determinant, the dots should follow the line exactly.
Time-on-ice is another key factor to team success. If a team has
players who can spend more time playing (on average) before fatigue sets
in, it has the advantage of having more rested players. The average on ice
time for the data sample used in this study is 17.93 minutes per game, or
less than 1/3 of the game. Teams that have players who can play well over
this average have a strategic advantage. This means they can let less
rested players sit longer. If the higher stamina players are big scorers, they
can leave them on the ice longer, increasing the likelihood of scoring.
Thus, time on ice is expected to have a positive coefficient and is
expected to be significant.
In this data set, player number 138 (Duncan Keith, Chicago
Blawkhawks) plays the most minutes on average, 28.66 per game. Of the
16 players who play the least, 13 of them are classified as enforcers. The
graph below shows the expected results. Within this sample, NHL teams
tend to pay more for players who play more, no matter what position.
Again, however, the graph remains somewhat scattered, which indicates
that time on ice per game is not the only factor determining salary.

VI. Results
The results of the OLS regression are shown in the table below:
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Dependent Variable: Salary
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, variant HC1
Coefficient
Const
Enforcer
PPG
TOIPG
Mean dependent var

Std. Error

t-ratio

p-value

-2.60E+06

413907

-6.2872

0.0000

485960

239056

2.0328

0.0431

3.16E+06

432806

7.3052

0.0000

207263

25460.7

8.1405

0.0000

2731791 S.D. dependent var

1944063.0000

Sum Squared resid

5.96E+14 S.E. of regression

R2

0.413647 Adjusted R2

0.4070

F(3,266)

63.93513 P-value (F)

3.70E-31

Log-likelihood
Schwarz criterion

-4220.223 Akaike criterion
8462.841 Hanna-Quinn

1497012.0000

8448.4470
8454.2270

As predicted, all three variables have positive coefficients. Enforcer
is statistically significant at the 95% level. Points per game (PPG) and
time on ice per game (TOIPG) are significant at the 99% level. For a
salary equation, the adjusted R2 is quite good at .407. Heteroskedasticity
is accounted for and corrected by the model.
If a variable has a positive coefficient, it means it has a positive
impact on a player’s salary (the dependent variable). The regression
shows that, all else equal, a player who averages one additional point per
game in the NHL during the 2010-2011 season earns an additional 3.16
million dollars. Time on ice per game (TOIPG) has a coefficient of
207,263. This means an increase of playing time by one minute per game
on average, all else equal, would increase a player’s salary by 207,263
dollars.
The enforcer variable is a dummy variable. The coefficient of
enforcer is a “one-time payment” so to speak. Either you get the payment
for being an enforcer, or you don’t. If a team believes that a player
possesses the qualities and attributes to be an enforcer, all else equal, the
player’s salary on average will increase 485,960 dollars. The positive
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coefficient for enforcer shows that teams view the ability to be violent as
a positive attribute.

VII. Limitations
A study of this nature has a few limitations. Contracts pertaining to salary
can be somewhat unreliable. Many players sign long contracts in their
first few years to ensure themselves money if they don’t succeed.
However, some players go way above and beyond the expectations of
their contracts. When this happens, teams reap the benefits of
exceptionally good players at low costs. On the flip side, a player could
be extremely good and sign a lengthy contract, only to become mediocre
in his older age or due to injury.
Another limitation is that there is no official position of “enforcer.”
While it is felt that the clustering analysis used in this paper is very
accurate, there is no guarantee. Some players in this study may be
classified as enforcers when in fact they are not. This can skew some of
the data and provides some small level of expected error.
Previous research on violence in sports can be found everywhere.
However, research around team compensation for violent acts tends to be
sparse. Even more sparse, are studies that focus on compensation for
violence in hockey. Most papers look at whether violence sells more
tickets. However, violence has a multitude of impacts on the game besides
ticket sales. This means the research presented in this paper is somewhat
original, especially since the rule changes in 2005.

VIII. Conclusion
This study clearly shows that NHL teams do in fact incorporate this
“enforcer” attribute into salary determination. The results show that the
predictions were correct and that they make sense. People who score more
and play more tend to make more money. What wasn’t nearly as clear was
whether the NHL offered employment to, and thus compensated players
who lack the most necessary skills to succeed in the game. With 95%
confidence, this study can say that they do indeed do just that. NHL teams
use these violent enforcers in a strategic way to maximize profits while
not sacrificing success on the ice. “I went to a fight and a hockey game
broke out” may be a bit extreme, but there is certainly evidence that NHL
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organizations do little to prevent it from happening. Perhaps, this study
would conclude that they encourage it.
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